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Christians in Gilgit: Negotiating subalternity and citizenship
Intellectual projects are no doubt products of their times, but do they also 
belong to them? Partha Chatterjee, an early member of the South Asian Sub-
altern Studies Group, recently made that claim when heralding the end of 
Subaltern Studies – a historical approach that started to re-write (national) 
history ‘from below’. “The task, as it now stands cannot, I think, be taken for-
ward within the framework of the concepts and methods mobilized in Subal-
tern Studies” (Chatterjee 2012: 44), he argues in After Subaltern Studies. It 
is especially two crucial ideas of the theoretical approach he is refusing: first, 
the externality of ‘the subaltern’ and second the image of the ‘subaltern rebel’.
Starting from Chatterjee’s argument this article critically reviews the 
Subaltern Studies project to then discuss empirical material from a fieldwork 
in Gilgit in 2013. Focusing on the socio-political situation of the Christian 
minority and their politics, the approach is revised as also recently develop-
ments like the notion of the ‘subaltern citizen’ are introduced and discussed. 
Is the Subaltern Studies project really outdated and the subaltern rebel a 
figure of the past? The article doubts it pointing to a need not only for new 
concepts that cast the paradoxes and complexities of contemporary subalter-
nities in one theoretical notion but also to a reflected plurality of theoretical 
approaches as they enable us to tell different stories of modernity.     
Subalternity reconsidered
Subaltern Studies have always been subject to criticism, leading scholars to 
rework theoretical outlines and research questions. The political project of 
Subaltern Studies was formulated by a group of historians in South Asia in 
the 1980s but over the years was adopted in Latin America, Africa and also 
by scholars from ‘the West’. The concept was adopted and further developed 
in other disciplines, among them sociology, anthropology and pedagogy. Sub-
altern Studies began as a critical historical approach focusing on ‘people’s 
history’ in colonial times, strongly influenced by the paradigm of structural-
ism. By the 1990s it was reworked in the framework of Post-structuralism. 
Maria Beimborn
„This is the greatest gift of deconstruction: 
to question the authority of the investigating subject 
without paralyzing him.” (Spivak 1988: 9)
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Questions of subalternity were linked to Postcolonial Critique. In that turn, 
the early structuralist claim of a ‘subaltern consciousness’ was reformulat-
ed as question: How does subaltern self-consciousness develop? Subaltern 
Studies became a field with diffuse borders. The now rather interdisciplinary 
approach has been increasingly addressing questions of subalternity in con-
temporary times: in postcolonial as well as in ‘western’ and global contexts. 
The critical approach is not only asking for societal and cultural mechanisms 
of exclusion and marginalization and the experiences and politics of ‘the sub-
altern’ but also of figurations of power and knowledge. 
Who ‘the subaltern’ are and what subalternity is, has since the very be-
ginning been a matter of debate. “I like the word ‘subaltern’ for one reason”, 
Spivak stated in the middle of turmoil. “It is truly situational. ‘Subaltern’ be-
gan as a description of certain rank in the military”, “(…) was later used under 
censorship of Gramsci (…) [who] was obliged to call the proletarian ‘subal-
tern’” and “(…) has been transformed into the description of everything that 
doesn’t fall under strict class analysis. I like that, because it has no theoreti-
cal rigor.” (Spivak 1990: 141) 
The concept has been, and still is criticized for being blurred and con-
ceptually empty. Over time though, various scholars have put much effort to 
sharpen the notion – not least in order to point out the political program of 
the approach. And there is an ongoing debate on how essential / how partial 
different subalternities have been in the past as well as in contemporary so-
cieties.
Guha, often considered the founding father of the South Asian Studies 
Group, in 1982 only loosely defined ‘the subaltern’ when describing it as: “the 
demographic difference between the total Indian population and all those 
whom we have described as the ‘elite’”. While in the beginning she expressed 
sympathy for the conceptual vagueness, Spivak has been offering continu-
ously new definitions of subalternity since the beginning of the 1990s, giving 
attention to different aspects of the societal status. The loose materialistic 
conceptualization in Subaltern Studies, which was taken from Gramsci’s 
work on the proletariat in industrializing Europe, was abandoned, when in 
the 1990s she defined subalternity as exclusion from cultural production. 
Subaltern, she said in an interview, is “everything that has limited or no ac-
cess to cultural imperialism—a space of difference” (De Kock 1992: 45). In 
2005 she underlined the very practical and political dimension of subalterni-
ty, stating: “When we are talking about subaltern isolation we are not talking 
some fuzzy hegemonic identity, we are talking about the abstract structures 
of civil society to which the subaltern has no access.” Defending the notion 
against its current misuse, she argues “[t]he subaltern is not one of those 
wishy-washy, weepy, whimsy, hybrid identities type concept at all” (Dhawan 
2007 citing Spivak 2003, see also Milevska 2003). Another two years later 
she highlighted another aspect of societal exclusion:  “subalternity is where 
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social lines of mobility, being elsewhere, do not permit the formation of a 
recognizable basis of action” (Spivak 2005: 476). An outline of the ongoing 
debate cannot possibly be done here, but even the short listing of some defini-
tions – some of which we will discuss in more detail later – can at least indi-
cate the richness of the Subaltern Approach. Let us now see what Chatterjee 
referred to when claiming the end of subaltern studies.
Why does the indebted farmer of today’s India choose suicide?       
Reconsidering the subaltern paradigm
Guha’s early theoretical outline has caused an ongoing debate. Especially two 
interlinked arguments provoked dispute. Firstly that the “politics of people... 
[form] an autonomous domain” (Guha 1982: 40). And secondly his structur-
alist explanation: the claim of a ‘subaltern consciousness’. Chatterjee, in his 
recent article, claims that for this theoretical body time has come.
In Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India (1983) 
Guha argued “the lower classes, historically on the defensive, can only achieve 
self-awareness via a series of negations via their consciousness of the identity 
and class limits of their enemy.” The subaltern, “learned to recognize himself 
not by the properties and attributes of his own social being but by diminu-
tion, if not negation, of those of his superiors” (Guha 1983: 18). 
Chatterjee defends this approach to be appropriate at that time. Guhas 
essentialism “was not a question of drawing the faces in the crowd (…) [T]he 
insurgent peasants of Colonial India were political not in a sense of the indi-
vidualized bourgeois citizen of liberal democracy, they were mass-political 
subjects whose rationality had to be sought in the collective life of peasant 
community. He found his answer in the structure of rebel consciousness 
which he located, in turn, in the structure of the peasant community” (Chat-
terjee 2012: 46).
Subaltern Studies back then were accused of positivist essentialism, re-
covering a subject from archives that actually never existed. Spivak, referring 
to the political program of the critical historical approach of writing ‘people’s 
history’, claimed ‘the subaltern’ to be a necessary theoretical fiction. “I would 
read it“, she wrote, “as a strategic use of positivist essentialism in a scrupu-
lously visible political interest” (Spivak 1988: 13). She had highlighted the 
voicelessness of ‘the subaltern’ in her influential essay first published in 1988 
Can the subaltern speak? (Spivak 2007) She contributed crucially to shap-
ing Subaltern Studies’ twofold program: telling the history of the subaltern 
and speaking up against contemporary subalternity. Later on, though, she 
backed her defense of essentialism, claiming “Subaltern Studies had no need 
for such apologetics” (Spivak 2000: 332). 
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The whole debate around the subaltern consciousness, Chatterjee argues la-
tely, was based on a misunderstanding. The figure of the ‘rebel consciousness’ 
was never meant to explain all peasant politics. Defending Guha and the ear-
ly South Asian Studies group he points to Guhas essay Chandras Death – a 
story of a non-insurgent peasant – and Weapons of the Weak (Scott 1985) to 
prove that they were aware of the diversity of popular politics as well as the 
need for their separate analysis. In his influential book Scott pointed to the 
myriad of forms of everyday practices of subaltern resistance: loud and con-
fronting ones like insurrection and terrorism and silent and inverse forms 
that don’t involve direct confrontation with authorities, like i.e. desertion, 
false compliance, pilfering, slander or sabotage.
Subaltern Studies have always had a disproportional interest in and paid 
much attention to subaltern resistance. Subaltern politics of non-resistance, 
i.e. cooperation and collaboration, negotiations and involvements were wide-
ly ignored and poorly theorized. The figure of the ‘subaltern rebel’ and the 
structuralistic framed argument of a subaltern ‘rebel consciousness’ led to 
such a limited focus and an overestimation of resistance and subversion in 
the margins of societies. Spivak’s introduction to Selected Subaltern Studies 
(Spivak 1988) can be read as a critique and redirection of Subaltern Stud-
ies, as an effort to abandon Guha’s theoretical framework and its essentialist 
notion of subalternity and shift away from structuralist explanations to the 
question of how subaltern self-consciousness emerges. 
Another reading suggests that she preserved the idea of a ‘subaltern reb-
el consciousness’ in post-structural theory even though reworking it as “sub-
altern effect”. If misunderstood or not, there is a need for awareness that the 
plurality, complexity and ambiguity of the politics of the people, analyzed in 
the framework of subalternity, are not dismissed. The theoretical framework 
and political interest of the approach simply suggest framing any everyday 
practices and politics as resistance and subversion.
Let’s come back to Chatterjee’s funeral eulogy. He withdraws from two 
fundamental ideas of theoretical paradigms, firstly the conceptualization of 
subaltern politics as ‘external’ and independent domain and secondly the 
conceptualization of the subaltern subject as ‘subaltern rebel’. Both ideas had 
been criticized much earlier, i. e. in 1992 by Masselos, co-editor of various 
volumes of Subaltern Studies, speaking up against the stereotyping of ‘the 
subaltern’ in Subaltern Studies. Ludden in his introduction to Reading Sub-
altern Studies summarizes: 
“[Masselos] calls ‘the subaltern’ . . . a creation, a reification of 
historians, which combines a polarised social category with 
the ‘mentality of opposition’, and which he distinguishes from 
real subaltern people, in the real world (…). He rejects Subaltern 
Studies theoretical identification of subordinate social status 
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with mentalities of resistance and literary penchant for drama-
tising class opposition, both of which he traces to the activist 
world of the late 1960s and early 1970s. (…) In reality, he says, 
subaltern ‘acts of resistance link up with, interact with, intersect 
with what is happening around them’. In his view, any theory of 
subaltern autonomy would tend to erase real subalterns from 
history.“ (Ludden 2002:  23) 
Chakrabarty had challenged Guha’s argument of subaltern politics being an 
autonomous domain even earlier. In braces he clarifies that subaltern politics 
are of course only a ‘relative’ autonomous and independent domain. In the 
same text he offers – again quite casually and in parenthesis – a quite short 
but rich outline of subalternity: “Subalternity – the composite culture of re-
sistance to and acceptance of domination and hierarchy – (…)” (Chakrab-
arty1985:  376). In a number of works he points to the complexity and am-
bivalence of subalternity – a point that will be argued at some length later.
Why then does Chatterjee disqualify the theoretical paradigm of early 
Subaltern Studies now? Drawing to the changing situation of contemporary 
Indian peasantry – the subaltern subject per se – he argues that:
“(…) now the activities of the government have penetrated deep 
into the everyday lives of rural people and affect matters like 
the supply of water to their fields or electricity to their homes, or 
the access to their villages to public roads and transport to the 
facilities of schooling, public health services, public distribution 
to subsidies food grains or kerosene, and employment in pub-
lic works, or indeed such novel necessities as the registration 
of lands and houses or births and deaths, should we not expect 
that even mass political action will no longer be characterized 
principally by the marks of negation.” (Chatterjee 2012: 47)
The point he makes is by no means valid exclusively with regard to Indian 
rural peasantry but true for most of the groups that have been described 
within the framework of Subaltern Studies, i.e. peasants, dalits, slaves, or-
phans, black people, ethnic and religious minorities. It is quite emblematic 
that the ‘drastic change of the objective conditions of subaltern studies’ in his 
opinion is caused by a changing style of governance and democratization – 
the role of subaltern subjects and the ‘politics of the governed’ in history and 
for change are neglected in that story. Under these new conditions he claims 
that the theoretical figure of the ‘subaltern rebel’ is useless: Formations of the 
political mass and mass-politics in contemporary democratic India cannot 
be understood applying the antiquated paradigm. Why do indebted farm-
ers of today’s India choose suicide despite the rich tradition of insurrection 
against money-lenders recorded by historians? Chatterjee keeps silence.
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“The subaltern rebel so meticulously portrayed by us, now 
seemed like a throwback to the days of the British Raj – a con-
struct that historians of colonial India might find useful but one 
that would be of little help in understanding the contemporary 
Indian peasant. We now saw that the latter would have to be 
understood within a new framework of democratic citizenship, 
perhaps fundamentally altered from the normative ideas of citi-
zenship in western liberal democracies, but nonetheless citizen-
ship, not subjecthood. Subalternity would have to be redefined.” 
(Chatterjee 2012:  45f)
He doesn’t exclude the possibility that there still are and will be “relatively 
marginal zones” of subaltern insurrection. In those cases the approach still 
holds its validity, he argues. But “[j]ust as the relation between rulers and 
subjects have changed, so has the formation of the political mass” (ibid. 47). 
But nowadays the different groups are increasingly involved with govern-
ment agencies and contemporary subaltern politics take forms of  “[r]ather 
complex negotiations (…) between the insurgent movements and government 
agencies over what services and benefits should be delivered, to whom and 
through which agencies, and who should supervise the operations“ on the 
one and “the ordinary stuff of democratic politics“ in form of “constant tus-
sles of different populations groups with authorities over the distribution of 
governmental services” on the other hand.  “These tussles become political”, 
he thereby states, “because many of the demands cannot be conceded within 
the normal rules of legal and bureaucratic rationality. The usual way accom-
modating those demands is to declare them as exceptional cases that have 
to be dealt with by administrative adjustments to the normal rules, without, 
however, jeopardizing the normative rationality of the legal structure itself” 
(ibid.). 
When it comes to the task of how to understand contemporary subal-
ternities, I feel the need to add one point Chatterjee misses out on. His ar-
gumentation never leaves the frame of the national state. Do states form an 
autonomous domain? Not only federal and provincial governments but also 
the ‘politics of people’ – to borrow a common term of Subaltern Studies - are 
shaped and do interrelate with international and global politics as well as 
different institutions and social movements acting on an international and 
global scale. Additionally, the practices of global and international politics 
have changed: they are increasingly creeping into every day lives of even 
the most marginalized segments on the globe. Questions of exclusion and 
negation, of subaltern self-consciousness, mechanisms of formation of po-
litical mass/action and voice/lessness urgently need to be reconsidered and 
researched considering new complexities and involvements (see also Spivak 
2000a: 332). Thereby it needs to be considered that while on the one hand 
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global democratic politics and global capitalism, i. e. in form of agendas of 
development or gender, subjectify and empower different groups that are 
rather excluded in national or local communities, on the other hand new sub-
alternities arise. Subaltern status(es) become more ambivalent and complex 
just as the arena of ‘subaltern politics’. 
But is all that really new? And if not so, how to avoid throwing out the 
baby with the bath? Subaltern Studies today are much more than an anti-
quated structuralist project, as Chatterjee’s article could make us believe. 
The approach is rather characterized by constant reformulations of its very 
fundamental concepts and a heterogeneous and pluralist theoretical body. 
No doubt the ‘old’ concept of subalternity needs to be reformulated, not only 
regarding the case of rural peasantry but also subaltern urbanism in the 
global south (see i.e.  Roy 2011) as well as in respect of the ‘old’ subalterni-
ties, that might change and the ‘new’ subalternities, that are emerging under 
new societal conditions (in form of new figurations of power, new forms of 
governance, global capitalism etc). Spivak argued to women being the new 
subaltern of global capitalism while pointing to the ambiguity of oppression 
and empowerment, the voicelessness and the giving voice through and in 
global women politics (Spivak 2000b). She has not only analyzed the chang-
ing situation of subaltern women but also of scheduled tribes through politi-
cal agendas of development and gender (Spivak 2000a). Others argued im-
migrants, illegalized people and people without papers to be ‘the subaltern’ of 
contemporaneous times (see Odem 2009; Chea 2010). Looking to approaches 
regarding questions of subalternity, we can see a rich and diverse theoretical 
body and methodological plurality, both with constant reworking under way.
Chatterjee closes his paper with an outlook on new projects to come. 
According to him not only the theoretical paradigm of Subaltern Studies is 
useless to understand subalternity in contemporary times, but also the his-
torical methodology is incompatible with current questions. The methodol-
ogy fails, he argues, when it comes to the study of visual communication i.e. 
cinema – a widely neglected field in Subaltern Studies but important archive 
of popular culture (especially in regions with universal illiteracy) especially 
when it comes to the search for subaltern voice. The historical method also 
fails when it comes to understanding everyday practices. He points to the 
“autonomous status of embodied or institutionalized practices whose signifi-
cance cannot simply be tread of texts describing the underlying concepts.” 
(Chatterjee 2012: 49). Looking towards the new projects to come he sees Sub-
altern Studies “shift to the ethnographic, the practical, the everyday and the 
local” (ibid.). The Subaltern Studies approach of his time therefore to him 
seems mistimed.  
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The paradox of subalternity and citizenship
Pandey’s book Subaltern Citizens and their Histories (Pandey 2010a) is not 
meant to be a restart but rather a critical rework of the conceptual framework 
and an emphasis of the political program of Subaltern Studies. The book is 
quite an innovative assemblage. Works on different subalternities, histori-
cal and contemporary ones, in India and the US are standing side by side. It 
is the result of a new conceptual outline of contemporary subalternity: the 
‘subaltern citizen’. “The immediate advantage of the term ‘subaltern citizen’”, 
Pandey argues, is that “it prevents the easy erection of a barrier between us 
(citizens, the people with history) and them (subalterns, people without), as 
well as between our times (the time of equality, democracy, the recognition 
of human worth) and earlier times (the time without reason and such under-
standing) (Pandey 2010b: 1).
The notion is meant to be a provocative theoretical figure, pointing out 
the simultaneity of subalternity and citizenship. That, Pandey argues, is a 
“fairly common contemporary condition” (ibid.:  5), established in the second 
half of the twentieth century. Subaltern groups in most parts of the globe have 
been “granted the status of citizens (right-holders, inhabitants, subjects of the 
state) without becoming quite ‘mainstream’” (ibid.). Even for those without 
such a status, “their existence as relatively stable populations has been se-
cured (…) by the essential character of many services they provide, and they 
have been able consequently to make certain kinds of claims on state and 
quasi-state resources” (ibid.). In contrast to Chatterjee, Pandey’s conceptual 
reframing is not only an answer to the changing conditions of subalternity in 
contemporary society but also meant to finally recover the subaltern subject 
as an agent of history and change. In his eyes Subaltern Studies so far have 
failed. While using the term ‘citizen’, he excuses himself for not having found 
a more suitable term for now, as “a modifier for ‘subaltern’, an indicator of the 
political quality of all subalternity (and all dominance)” (ibid.). The concept 
is meant to disrupt historical and political narratives. 
“The pairing of the terms subaltern and citizen should accom-
plish precisely such a disruption, since the idea of the citizen flies 
in the face of almost everything found in the commonly received 
narrative of subalternity, which is a description and analysis of 
a condition anticipated as a condition of the down and out, the 
miserable, and the victimized. The word subaltern plainly rein-
forces what the charge of a critical historiography (…) has long 
been: the endeavor to recover subject positions, lives, possibili-
ties and political actions that have been marginalized, distorted, 
suppressed and even forgotten. The term citizen helps to under-
line (…) the fact of historical agency and political arrangement 
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(or ‘persuasion’). It draws attention forcefully to the ‘citizenly’, 
the political quality in subalternity.” (ibid. 7)
With his provocative theoretical figure, Pandey highlights the complexities 
and paradoxes marking the status(es) of subalternity. He explains that he 
uses the term citizen in two different senses: “first as the bearer of the legal 
right to residence, political participation, state support and protection in a 
given territory; the second, a more diffuse sense of acceptance in, and ac-
ceptance of, an existing order or existing social arrangements” (ibid.5). His 
definition cites and twists Chakrabarty’s notion from 1985 (claiming sub-
alternity to be the combination of the resistance against and acceptance of 
domination). Chakrabarty’s concept was framed by ideas of ‘the state’ and 
‘the people’ as separate spheres, the latter forming a relatively independent 
political domain. People’s (national) history was written as a history of native 
culture and subaltern insurrections, detached from official (national) history 
made by elites and political parties (see Ludden 2002: 8). Even though popu-
lar resistance to state power was a prominent field of study, subaltern poli-
tics were drawn as quite effectless on the national (elite) history. In contrast, 
Pandey’s concept of citizenly modulation of the subaltern subject directs the 
focus on the subaltern citizens’ potentiality and practices of changing his-
tory.  Pandey’s paradox figure of the subaltern citizen, forcing attention to 
the citizenly forms and political quality of subaltern everyday politics, forms 
the background to the following discussion of ethnographic data from field-
work among the Christian immigrant community of Gilgit. In the presented 
case we will thereby see that at certain times, the ‘citizenly’ needs to be un-
derstood in a very literal sense: even though formally citizenship and rights 
are negated to the immigrant community, their social organization, political 
practice and everyday experiences are throughout ‘citizenly’ – though in a 
sense that differs from concepts of liberal democracy. 
Christians in Gilgit 
Last summer I spent six weeks doing research in Gilgit.1 There are only few 
historical and not any contemporary accounts of the Christian minority liv-
ing here, so I started with a broad focus reconstructing the migration and 
getting insights into the current socio-political situation, community organi-
zation and religious life. My research interest though was the political sphere, 
especially the relation between the minority and ‘the state’. The Christian 
households are scattered over the city and various conflicts crack through 
the community. To get grip of different perspectives and (hi)stories I needed 
to establish different access points. Changing and cutting fronts provided 
not only insights into the rivalries within the community but also created 
awareness of two things: firstly the plurality of actors and their networking 
1 I am grateful to the DAAD for generously funding fieldwork in the town.
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and negotiating with government agencies, politicians, local authorities, lo-
cal middlemen, Pakistani churches and international donors; secondly that 
political positions, strategies and practices were multilayered as they were 
internal community politics as well as politics for the Christian communi-
ty. The image of subalternity has been ascribed to the religious minority in 
Pakistan not only by international media but also by various scientists. The 
situation of Christians in Pakistan is generally portrayed as an inter-faith 
relation. Christians are described as culturally marginalized and discrimi-
nated minority in an (increasingly) ‘Islamic state’ (see Gabriel 2007). O’Brien 
has contributed to widen the picture by writing a history of Christianity in 
the region that starts long before the ‘Islamization’ of the state, the inde-
pendence of Pakistan and even the ‘mass-movement’ – a term referring to 
a mass conversion around the turn of the 19th to the 20th century in Punjab. 
The Construction of Pakistani Christian Identity (O’Brien 2006) was pub-
lished in the Subaltern Studies Series of the Research Society of Pakistan. 
The work, being the first of that kind and based on a long-term ethnographic 
study, draws a rich picture of Christian history and culture. He fails though 
to recover the Christians of Pakistan as subject(s) of history and change. The 
collective identity drawn in his work is a subaltern identity in the classical 
shape of early Subaltern Studies. The image drawn of Pakistani Christians is 
that of ‘sweepers’, of a ‘passive’ and ‘excluded’ community. Community cul-
ture and especially religion are drawn as a separate sphere: a space of honor, 
lived ‘equality’ and ‘ritual role reversing’; a place where the ‘spoiled identity’ 
is managed. In his concluding chapter he points to the ‘struggle, resilience, 
and unconquerability’ of the Pakistani Christian identity. 
Drawing on the frame of subaltern citizenship, in the following pages I 
decided to tell a different story. We will focus on the relation of the Christian 
community with the surroundings, the struggles, involvements and negotia-
tions with ‘the state’ as well as the disputes and cracks that run through it. 
Special attention will be directed to the ‘citizenly’ dimension of Christian 
politics in Gilgit. Different theories create different stories and as you will 
see, the following one is inspired by the notion of the ‘subaltern citizen’.  We 
will come across non-political politics as well as non-Christian Christian pol-
iticians, grassroot-democracy and favouritism, exchange systems in which 
citizenly rights are traded and not least stories in which the hegemonic nar-
ratives of impurity and honor, that structure Christian’s social status, are 
subverted.
Externality – the central feature of subalternity – to my opinion is a 
somehow misleading idea when talking about the relation of the Christian 
minority of Gilgit and ‘the state’. To start in the beginning: the immigration 
of Christians to Gilgit-Baltistan and especially to the city of Gilgit is directly 
linked to the (increasing) presence of ‘the state’ in the northern region. Talk-
ing about ‘the state’ in the context of Gigit-Baltistan is confusing as long as 
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there are at least two if not three powers of political governance: the govern-
ment of Gilgit Baltistan, the Pakistani State and the Pakistani military. The 
installment of a central government in the announced region’s capital Gilgit, 
and the increasing presence of the Pakistani state and military led to a fast in-
crement of public space. Christian military sweepers being transferred back 
from the northern bases to the lowlands must have spread the notice in their 
communities that there is work up in the north, different people guessed, 
and that is how the migration started. The work of public cleaning – be it 
of streets, canals, offices or toilets – as well as handling certain materials 
like blood or excrements is widely stigmatized as impure. So while cleaning 
public space is an intolerable job for locals – the only locals performing such 
jobs are people with mental disorders and disabilities – not least because the 
discourse of im/purity is closely linked to the discourse of honor, for Paki-
stani Christians it has been a quite common work and important resource of 
income over decades. Today’s situation, Pakistani Christians working in the 
‘spheres of impurity’, also results of a historical arrangement: A great part of 
Christians stem from converts belonging to a group that has been discussed 
as the caste of sweepers (for a controversial discussion see O’ Brien 2006: 
37ff). Other job opportunities are scarce, and the public cleaning sector – as 
they are often government jobs – offers acceptable and secures incomes for 
Christians. That counts especially for people with low education. Sweeping 
jobs have led quite many Christian families to urban areas where they per-
form a great part of public cleaning. Gilgit forms no exception, as the minor-
ity also here performs the cleaning of the main streets and canals, the bazaar 
and public toilets in the city and main mosques. It is also mainly Christians 
who clean government offices, banks, the university, and hotels and who are 
holding the positions of sweepers in the military and its different institutions, 
i.e. it is Christians handling all ‘the impure’ in the local military hospital. In 
contrast to lowland cities, in Gilgit only the sweepers employed by the Paki-
stani state and military have the privileged status of government servants. 
The vast of public cleaning is organized through a contractor-system. Every 
two years the contractor-positions, called tekedar, are announced newly and 
due to government authorities the lowest offer wins. Until now it were always 
Christians holding these positions. The tekedar positions promise both: high 
influence within the community as well as easy access to government offi-
cials and social capital in form of relations – a good that is highly important 
to access certain goods and privileges. Both tekedars enjoy sovereignty in 
managing the work and can decide independently whom and to which condi-
tions they employ their subcontractors. There has been an ongoing struggle 
for the tekedar positions in Gilgit, creating a serious antagonism between 
two extended families and a lot of trouble within the whole community. En-
mity has increased and several cases have been filed in that ongoing conflict. 
But before telling that story, let me first sketch the general socio-political 
situation of the Christian immigrants. 
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It can be stated that the socio-political situation and the politics of Christians 
in Gilgit generally seem to be shaped by three factors: firstly, a lack of know-
ledge about Christianity; secondly, the political negation of citizenship; and 
thirdly an inclusion of Christians in the workforce. Even though we need to 
recognize that this is an unfavorable inclusion in many aspects it deserves 
consideration that it creates a certain intimacy between the minority and ‘the 
state’. Let us take a closer look at those three. 
Gilgit-Baltistan officially presents itself as “self-governed region” char-
acterized by ethnic and religious plurality (see http://www.gilgitbaltistan.
gov.pk/). In the city of Gilgit, apart from Sunni and Shia, there is a commu-
nity of Ismailis and the mosque of Ahmadiyya in the city center has lately 
(re)opened. The first Christians migrated to Gilgit in the beginning or mid-
1980s. They are, also due to immigration from relatives, today forming the 
largest extended families holding various community offices and struggle 
with each other for the tekedar positions. Apart from them, there are vari-
ous nuclear families and also single young men, the latter mostly performing 
temporary jobs in fields considered unacceptable by locals like private clean-
ing, construction work or painting. Additionally there are about 100 military 
sweepers, some with, some without families in Gilgit. The vast majority is 
living in poor conditions. Some of the households are loosely organized in 
neighborhoods. Other mechanisms of building solidarity networks between 
not-related families are marriage, the establishment of fictive kinship rela-
tions called mubala bhai/ mubala behen, and not least celebrating feasts in 
the churches as well as by private people. The latter as I learned during my 
stay can be based on shared Punjabi customs or be invented traditions. The 
churches and religious community life play an important role for community 
organization but are by no means the only space and form of community 
building and governance. In context of a struggle for a ‘real church’ a demo-
cratic council was held and the community elected their representatives. But 
this story will be told a bit later.
Today Gilgit counts about 50 Christian households, nuclear and extend-
ed families as well as compositions of non-related persons that reside in the 
city permanently. As long as I heard Christians haven’t suffered much daily 
discrimination, nor have there been any cases of faith-based violence. Over 
the years quite some ‘Christian’ infrastructure has been established: three 
churches (the so called ‘chapel house’ that has been closed after a conflict, 
one church called the ‘real church’ and one people refer to as ‘community’ 
or ‘house church’), a Christian cemetery, a school and an NGO, running dif-
ferent community and disaster relief projects in the region. Christian peo-
ple used to praise their new home when talking to me, not only for natural 
beauty but also for the situation in the north being friendly and safe. Thereby 
they pointed to lowland Pakistan, where they felt insecurity and faith-based 
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violence increasing and fear rising2. I noticed however that quite a lot of se-
curity arrangements are being made: high walls have been built around the 
church compound, pupils are transported from hostels to school and back, 
wardens watch the gates of the Christian institutions, many private houses 
are protected by dogs and people generally don’t stay out after dusk. The ar-
rangements, people argued, are necessary because of the ongoing sectarian 
tensions between Sunnis and Shia and the masses are incalculable in times 
of turmoil. “We have to be careful, especially in Gilgit-Baltistan”, were the 
words of a pastor. Being careful is also an imperative that shapes his politics. 
“We do not want to get involved in politics”, he insisted and somehow de-
nied the political dimension of his broad networking activities, institutional 
involvements, his negotiations with government officials, politicians, intel-
ligence agencies, local authorities and not least the exchange arrangements 
between the Christian community and ‘the state’ that he shaped. 
Local people are inexperienced and they lack knowledge about Chris-
tianity, is what I was told as explanation for the situation. And indeed I was 
surprised that locals hardly knew anything nor recognized the presence of 
the religious minority. “Are there any Christians?” I was asked various times. 
“Is it a sect of Islam?” is a common question towards the pastor who also 
experiences a lot of curiosity. “Some” he said, “come to church to see if we re-
ally worship idols.” Till now conflicts between the Christian community and 
local opponents could be solved.  In the pastor’s eyes, the NGO and the school 
thereby play a crucial role. The NGO is running a peace project in which 
women from all faiths and local groups are provided a cost-free sewing train-
ing and the mixed groups are being educated in peace. The Christian school 
is a place where children from Christian families are studying together with 
local children. Due to its good reputation quite some local religious and po-
litical leaders send their children here. While the pastor highlighted the two 
Christian institutions as creating spaces for people of different faiths to come 
together, I’d like to point out that they create good grounds for networking, 
cooperation and exchange with local people and institutions. 
2 Within the last years violence against Christians is on the rise. Various 
Christian neighbourhoods and churches have been attacked. Last year the 
attack of two suicide bombers blasting in the catholic church of Peshawar 
caused 85 deaths and various injured.  The attack shattered the already 
frightened community. In 2011 Shahbaz Bhatti, the first ever Christian 
holding the office of a minister, had been killed by Therik-i-Taliban after 
Bhatti, in his office as minister of minorities, spoke up publically against the 
blasphemy law. The disputed law, installed under the military dictatorship 
of Zia- ul Haq in 1986, presents a serious thread for religious minorities 
living in Pakistan.  Repeatedly Christians have been accused of blasphemy 
and punished with draconic sentences. The mob burning down a Christian 
neighbourhood in Lahore in 2011, causing various deaths and great fear, is 
argued to have happened after a sanitary worker allegedly blasphemed the 
Prophet Mohamed.
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Christian residents are denied citizenship in the self-governed region so far. 
Legally they are citizens of the Pakistani state, while in Gilgit-Baltistan they 
have the status of immigrants. Even those who met the formal needs for citi-
zenship weren’t granted citizen status. The consequence is that Christians 
have no formal right to vote. That counts for all Christians in Gilgit-Baltistan: 
the community in Gilgit as well as the smaller ones concentrating around 
the military bases in Chilas and Skardu. According to the Christians I talked 
to, the status as immigrants modulates the precarious political situation of 
Christians in Giligit-Baltistan: the lack of voting rights, the denial of land 
ownership and the impossibility to get permanent jobs in the region’s gov-
ernment sector. These legal restrictions, which have been debated for some 
time, thereby aren’t practically enforced on all immigrants. It would have 
needed further research to find out why these rules are unequally enforced 
on different groups and people who immigrated to Gilgit. In practice though, 
it becomes apparent that the regulations of citizenship are also negotiable in 
the case of the Christian immigrants. With the power of relations rules have 
been bent and even though not citizen status but citizen rights became acces-
sible. In fact though, at the moment the religious minority has no legal politi-
cal representation within the democratic government neither of the region 
nor of the city. There were rumors, that the region has reserved seats for the 
minority (that due to the immigration politics are vacant). Whatsoever Gil-
git’s Christians still hold their NICs of Pakistan and their old homes are reg-
istered as their permanent address. As long as I got to know, they don’t make 
use of their voting right in their home towns and do not profit from their sta-
tus as citizens of the Pakistani state – for which they are sometimes envied 
by locals. Another result of the unsolved political relation between Pakistan 
and the region of Gilgit-Baltistan and the latter’s immigration politics is that 
the Christian immigrants practically have no access to goods and services 
provided to the poor by ‘the state’: neither to the services of the region nor to 
those provided through national welfare schemes. They could neither access 
the services and goods distributed through the Benazir Bhutto Income Sup-
port Program nor out of the Bait-ul-mal Fund. 
As a third aspect of the situation and politics of Christians in Gilgit, I 
want to discuss the ‘inclusion’ of the minority and the intimacy between the 
minority and ‘the state’ created through work performance. Christians per-
form government duties not only for the government of Gilgit-Baltistan and 
the municipality of Gilgit but also the Pakistani state and military present in 
the northern region. Christians are not only present but deeply involved in 
the governance of public space: as government servants of the Pakistani state 
and military, as permanent workers, tekedars and subcontractors, sweepers, 
drivers, wardens, gardeners etc. They literally form a part of ‘the state’. The 
term inclusion might be irritating here and no doubt it needs to be highlight-
ed that it is a quite unfavorable inclusion, as long as most work they perform 
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is stigmatized as impure, polluted and dishonorable. Even though locals de-
nied that the stigma of jobs and materials is passed on to those who perform 
them, I witnessed certain discomfort of locals with the Christian immigrants. 
To quote my local co-researcher, who joined me on two afternoons visiting 
Christian sweeper families:  “See, I am not like the others.” He said that when 
shaking the hand of the mosques toilet sweeper. A government official left 
no doubts when explaining to me why the municipality organizes cleaning 
work through the contractor/subcontractor model:  it serves to keep distance 
between the officers of the municipality and those handling waste, blood and 
excrements. In Gilgit-Baltistan as mentioned before not only Christians work 
in the ‘sphere of impurity’. As I learned from the same official, Christians 
even perform the better (paid) jobs as they generally work as sweepers, while 
the least honored job, that of the coolis – the collection and burning of waste 
– is done by local people with disabilities and mental disorders. 
Looking to the very practice, the relation between the in wide parts 
poor and illiterate religious minority and local Muslim society as well as ‘the 
state’ is by no means characterized only by distance and avoidance but also 
by proximity and intimacy. Cleaning government offices and private houses 
demands and creates mutual trust. In contrast to the other representation of 
these relations, I want to argue, that Christians are much closer to the Mus-
lim society and somehow much less excluded from ‘the state’ than generally 
perceived. Current works tend to mark the religious minority as ‘subaltern’ 
in a very classical sense (O’Brien 2006) and limit the picture to that of a 
structurally discriminated religious minority in a state that is discussed as 
‘Islamic’ (Gabriel 2007).  Such images of the situation negate the intimacy, 
which also shapes the relation between the religious minority and ‘the state’. 
At the end I am thankful to the local police and security agencies who with 
their mistrust made me realize the intimacy of that relation. While I had 
– not least because of the common representations of Pakistani Christians 
as excluded and subaltern – naïvely assumed my field of research laying at 
the very ‘margins of the state’, their attention and suspicion of misusing the 
Christians to access ‘the state’ from below helped to realize that I had entered 
into a quite intimate and sensible relationship characterized mainly by trust. 
Politics of ‘subaltern citizenship’
“Jesus kingdom is based on relations”. The pastor’s principle not only de-
scribes his ‘non-political’ political strategy but reflects the very conditions of 
the politics of the religious minority that, as we will see, is worth to consider 
also as an immigrant community. To fulfill his divine mission of the ‘uplift 
and development’ of the Christian community in Gilgit – the mission was 
conveyed to him in a dream shortly before graduating from a bible college in 
Lahore – the pastor has built up a quite complex network comprising west-
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ern missionaries, foreign donors, local party politicians as well as indepen-
dent candidates, different local businessmen, officers from the municipality, 
people from police and security agencies, influential Muslim citizens and his 
‘mother church’ in Lahore, to just mention a few. Within less then 15 years, a 
lot of networking and support from a handful of local Christian families, he 
has managed to build a school, found an NGO (that has faced strong opposi-
tions), and realized various projects of community development, crisis relief 
and peace education. He also managed to bend local rules and buy land to 
erect a Christian colony, with a ‘real church’, a women’s training center, two 
hostels for pupils (where the Christian children from the Christian commu-
nity of Chilas live during school times) and a house for his family. The eight 
plots for private houses, that together with the walled church area make the 
pasban colony, the Shepher’s Colony, were given to the church elders. The 
pastor’s phrase tells a lot about his work and career in Gilgit. Settling down 
in the city as a young man with a great vision, the way to reach his aims 
was constant networking and negotiating. He is successful with his strategy 
of doing politics without getting involved into the sphere of formal politics. 
That somehow characteristic form of subaltern politics needs to be consid-
ered when sketching the field of Christian politics. When looking to political 
practice in Gilgit the spheres of subaltern and formal politics are difficult to 
be separate and I doubt that they are clearly conceptually separable. In Gilgit 
not only (theoretically bureaucratically accessible and distributed) goods and 
services provided by government agencies but also citizenship and (theoreti-
cally inalienable) rights are subjects of political negotiations that are not nec-
essarily recognized or assumed as politics. Citizen rights have been traded 
like goods. It is maybe needless to say that the simple having of citizenship 
and citizen rights is nothing but a fiction of western liberal democracy. Look-
ing to political practice, citizenship is rather to be understood as a subject 
and result of political struggles and democratic rights are only showing ef-
fect when practically claimed and acted out in certain ways. It is a difficult 
question how to talk about such practices like the trading of citizenly rights 
as goods: Should we name it corruption, subversion of power or cultural ap-
propriation of rights? What I want to argue here is that not only in systems of 
favoritism but also wherever democracies become exclusive, certain forms of 
corruption like the ‘trade’ of citizenship, votes or rights (means things consid-
ered to be inalienable in the theory of liberal democracy) need to be assumed 
as possible profoundly ‘citizenly’ politics of the excluded. The same goes for 
accessing and trading goods and benefits provided by states and the global 
community. Through such ‘citizenly’ politics, the imagination of democracy 
and the claiming of rights outside the formal field of politics, the Christian 
minority of Gilgit has received various ‘citizenly’ goods in the past. Voting 
rights, to just mention one example, have been exchanged for the freedom 
of choice, and the community’s contribution to election victory was honored 
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with a paved street to the church. Such practices linking the Christian com-
munity and the local political sphere need to be understood in their com-
plexity and ambivalence as long as they move somewhere in-between trade, 
corruption, moral economy and democracy. Some exchange-systems thereby 
point quite far into the future: Building a school with a good reputation and 
accepting the children from influential local Muslim families is not only of 
help in the here and now as it helps to build moral relationships, but is also 
assumed as a good means to build a better future for all Christians in the 
country. The pastor is sure that education creates a moral bond between the 
privileged Muslim students and the Christian minority: When his students 
will be in power, they will somehow reciprocate, the pastor argued, pointing 
to evidence in the national history of Pakistan. 
The pastor of the ‘real church’, embedded in a strong support network, 
is one among many Christians engaged in the field of politics. The first of 
five men I want to introduce is his antagonist in the religious sphere: the 
pastor of the so called ‘house church’. The ongoing friction between the two 
pastors and their local supporters interfere deeply with community life. The 
pastor of the ‘real church’ and his people are being accused of being elitist, 
favoring their own people and lacking solidarity with the poor. The people 
of the ‘house church’ stylize themselves in contrast as the ‘real Christians’ 
with the ‘good hearts’ as they are caring for the needy. When listening to the 
other faction they point to the marginal role of the ‘house church’-people and 
blame them for being stuck in a ‘culture of poverty’. They are blamed of op-
posing their uplift strategy for the community. What is irritating is that both 
churches follow the same denomination and belong to the same Pentecostal 
mother church located in Lahore. As I attended church services and rituals in 
both churches, it seems that they follow quite similar cultural and religious 
practices. The reason for the community split isn’t to be found in the sphere 
of religion itself but rather in the socio-political struggles, to which I will 
come at some later time.
The third Christian actor in the political field that I want to introduce – 
and this time people name his activities ‘politics’– is a dreaded and widely 
condemned man. He is an offspring of one of the very first Christians that 
settled down in Gilgit. I had to puzzle together information from different 
sources to get a picture, firstly because the story from different factions of the 
community, local authorities and the newspaper differed substantially and 
secondly because people avoided elaborating the stories about him in detail. 
One reason behind was fear, as they mentioned, another an ongoing com-
munity conflict in which he was prominently involved and that was about to 
be fought in court. How come that man was so dreaded? He was sweeping 
the streets when he accidentally witnessed a crossfire in which a local politi-
cian was involved. It was his testimony in court that led to that the defendant 
was completely exonerated. After the incident the Christian sweeper, which 
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in contrast to most other Christians who originate from Punjab is from for-
mer NWFP, enjoyed great support from the family of the former defendant. 
The unusual alliance lead to an enduring empowerment of the sweeper and 
his family: He became member of his supporters’ party and started a politi-
cal career in Gilgit, claiming to be the sadder of the Christians and as their 
president also their legal political representative. While he is recognized as 
the Christian sadder in society – even though locals made fun of the sweeper 
playing the politician wearing white clothes and black vest – the Christians 
themselves pointed out that he was never elected by the community nor did 
he act on behalf of them. The reasons why he was feared were two: his in-
fluential networks on one hand and his rule when he was holding the teke-
dar position. Rumors told that he held the contractor-job of the municipal-
ity due to his networks to the local politician’s family, whom he saved from 
jail. Christians remember these times as a ‘reign of terror’ arguing that he 
tried to establish a chaudhary system in the city. The term chaudhary ori-
gins from colonial times and is traditionally used for landlords as well as a 
title of honor. With chaudhary system people generally refer to a hierarchi-
cal system, working on the base of dependency, sometimes in form of bound 
labor or slavery. I knew the term from my prior research in Islamabad, where 
members of the Christian communities with the term chaudhary referred to 
the (Christian) landowners, as well as those men holding broker positions. 
Due to the fact that such systems provide benefits and social securities – 
just like any patronage-system – chaudharys are ambivalent figures. The 
reputation of the chaudharys I came across ocillated between good and bad. 
Usually these men were blamed for having appropriated the land and goods 
where their power grounded in illegitimately. In Gilgit the terms chaudhary 
and chaudhary system were only used in a negative sense. Stories ranking 
around the self-named president of the Christians accused him of corrup-
tion, of having created fatal dependencies by making his laborers drug ad-
dicted, and for having treated them like slaves. His image was drawn as that 
of an entirely bad man, sometimes even as ‘the evil’ itself. In the ascribed 
role of the nominal Christian betraying his community he was imagined as 
a mythical counterpart of all those, who played with the role of being ‘the 
good’. He was also involved in a rivalry for the town’s tekedar positions – a 
conflict that had recently dramatized: The self-named sadder and his sons 
were suspected of having murdered the two brothers of the rivaling family. 
They were shot in the open street in 2012. When I did my research, the sus-
pect had left Gilgit and while some people guessed that he fled the city fear-
ing revenge, others told that with the help of his influential friends he got a 
tekedar position in another town. 
The fourth political actor that I wish to present here is the mentioned 
rivaling family: an extended, internally quarreling family to which the two 
murderd brothers belonged. During my fieldwork the family held office of 
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both contractor positions. The victims’ older brother was in charge for orga-
nizing the cleaning of public streets and canals as well as the town market, 
being the tekedar of the municipality. His brother in law was holding the 
tekedar position offered by military. The latter’s job is to organize the clean-
ing of the so called NLI market and a public toilet, which are both located 
on a former military compound in the very center of the city. Both men have 
settled down in Gilgit about seventeen years ago. Over the years they brought 
many relatives to the region. They were generally referred to as ‘good people’ 
as they were usually compared with the former tekedar and his rule. Lately 
though a vote of no confidence against the victims’ brother in law had caused 
serious disturbance. I first met the men in front of the public toilet where he 
was hanging out with his workers. After we spent the afternoon together with 
his family, I was invited to attend a celebration in his house the other week. 
What was to celebrate was the ‘first shave’ of his oldest son. The huge feast, 
to which the whole community was invited and many families showed up, 
had the character of a Punjabi wedding. The shave of the boy was performed 
by his uncles and father – but that was a marginal scene. The climax of the 
evenly celebration was rather when the priest of the ‘real church’ opened the 
prayers and issued the blessing for the family and when shortly after that 
the guests lavished hars on the boy and his parents. Hars – necklaces made 
of flowers and money – are traditionally given to the bridegroom and his 
parents. These (money-) gifts publicly show off the family’s social status. In 
such kind of feasts solidarity networks are not only made visible but also (re)
generated, as long as giving hars is a social obligation that usually requires 
balanced reciprocation. The illuminated scene, which happened in the dawn 
in the courtyard of the family’s house, turned out to be a great spectacle. One 
guest after the other posed with the freshly shaved boy and his parents in 
front of a plenty of pulled out mobile phone cameras. At night the guests were 
served generously with different meat-dishes and alcohol. 
I had been curious about the ceremony as long I had never heard of, nor 
attended a ‘first shave’ before. There was a good reason for that, I learned 
that evening, because the first shave of a son isn’t a Punjabi tradition, as the 
hosts insisted, but what not only ethnologists but also locals called an ‘in-
vented tradition’. By celebrating his sons ‘first shave’ the host while enhanc-
ing prestige and showing up as a respected man with a great solidarity net-
work, at the same time became highly suspicious. Why did he celebrate such 
a costly community feast and why at that very moment? The people I talked 
to offered different explanations: While some argued that the host intended 
to create acceptance for the marriage arrangement of his under aged daugh-
ter, others related the feast to the unsettled murder of his two brothers in 
law – as in that context he had fallen in the community’s disgrace. The whole 
murder-case was confusing: While the local newspaper had announced the 
self-made chaudhary as the suspected murderer, within the Christian com-
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munity at least one more man was openly suspected and that was the feast’s 
host. While the official story was one of envy between the two families rival-
ing for the town’s tekedar positions, rumors circled around the inner-family 
problems of the victims. All stories and their variations offered deep insights 
into the structure and conflicts of the young Christian community in Gilgit. 
Still though as an ethnographer it was neither my job nor was it a good idea 
to get involved in the unsettled case too deep. The danger to slip into ethi-
cal dilemmas was huge. Here I just want to highlight one highly interesting 
aspect of the case: The double murder was widely discussed in public but in 
the Christian versions it was only as the murder of just one man. The second 
victim – brother of the first – was not only left out of the stories but literally 
wiped out of the community’s collective memory. Why was that? It was on the 
cemetery where I got a hint as there was only one brother’s grave. The second 
victim, who died shortly after the incident in hospital, had converted to Islam 
and was married to a Muslim woman. If my information is right, that tragic 
case of the two brothers was cracked in two not only in the narratives of the 
Christians, but also by local authorities. The case of the murder of the Chris-
tian man, who died on the spot, was still open, while the one of his converted 
brother seemed to be closed. To cite the local newspaper informing about the 
case shortly after the killing: “It should be clear that this is the first incident 
of this sort in the history of Gilgit-Baltistan”. The article highlights that this 
was the first ever crime against the Christian minority, leaving no doubts 
that the murder was a “pure result of personal enmity”. That was the result of 
the police investigation after hearing the testimony of the wounded brother 
in hospital. Such clarifications seemed necessary not least because the very 
performance suggested a link to sectarian tensions shaking the region for 
decades. It was a classical target killing: a masked man had shot at the two 
brothers during sweeping work from the back of a driving motorbike. While 
the case of the Christian victim was about to be handled in court, the case of 
his converted brother had been solved otherwise: within the legal framework 
of the sectarian tensions. As his wife’s neighbors told, she had received com-
pensation by the state which is a common relief given to families affected by 
acts of terrorism.
There are more figures and groups in the young history of the Christian 
immigrants’ community, which should be mentioned when talking about 
politics. One that hasn’t appeared so far, not least because I came across him 
quite late in my fieldwork and couldn’t gather much information nor meet 
him to talk, is the democratically elected saddar of the Christians. The car-
penter, who has his own business in the side road of Jutial, is the offspring of 
another one of the very first Christians who settled down in Gilgit. He some-
how inherited his status from his father. An inscription on the cemetery hon-
ors him and his burial is remembered widely as it showed the great respect 
and central role the man played. His son not only administers the cemetery 
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today but also used to lead the prayers in the former community church. To-
day though he is an ally of the pastor of the ‘real church’ and holds office of 
an elder there. On Sundays it is him leading the small but impressive com-
munity’s ritual. The tall man with the henna-red beard stands up in front of 
the community and after a twisted horn is blown raises his fist and shouts 
three times with his strong voice: Jesus Christ victory! Hands raise and the 
people echo his battle cry. 
‘Making a community’ and struggling for a ‘real church’ 
As mentioned before, Gilgit at the moment has two churches: a so-called ‘real 
church’ and a ‘house church’. The status quo, even though it is contested, has 
been stable for at least six years. It is the result of a long struggle, complex 
involvements and negotiations not only within the Christian community but 
also with different local government agencies, Pakistani churches and inter-
national missions and donors. In the memory of the community, the strug-
gle for a ‘real church’ is strongly connected with the ‘making of community’. 
What that means and how it worked deserves a closer look. Thereby we will 
come across a whole range of politics: politics of citizenly and democratic 
self-empowerment of the immigrant religious minority, different forms of 
resistances and rivalries, negotiations and collaboration with ‘the state’, sub-
version of local power, and not least taking advantage of the local sectarian 
conflict in the minority’s struggle for a place.
Not least was the name of the first public place for Christian prayers in 
Gilgit disputed. People referred to it as ‘the catholic church’, always empha-
sizing that it was not a ‘real church’. Most called it the ‘chapel house’. The 
place that after a dispute has been closed was established by nuns from Ko-
hat/ Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa in the beginning of the 1990s. Local Christians 
used to hold prayers on Sundays and the nuns came every three months to 
perform ceremonies and give sacraments. “Sunday prayers was simply not 
enough, the church was in a bad condition and the area far away from people’s 
home and not safe. Extremists were living around. The nuns disappeared 
and people weren’t happy with the one leading the prayers afterwards. They 
stayed away.” That was one story I was told. Another one, that even though 
it always created laughs disqualified the place as a proper church, told that 
after the nuns fled the place police filed a case against the Muslim warden 
who was hiding marihuana inside the church. A third one offers insights into 
the power games and ongoing community disputes in the field of religion 
and tells of the very beginning of community building of the Christian im-
migrants who started a life in Gilgit.
At the start of research my perspective on the Christian community was 
strongly shaped by the pastor of the ‘real church’, who indeed was a great 
starting point as long as he offered rich and well structured information of 
Beimborn     Christians in Gilgit
88
the history of Christians and local institutions, especially the ‘real church’, 
school and NGO. I was very lucky to have met two Christian sweepers in 
university, as the fictive brothers generously helped me with my research and 
were open to discuss all thoughts and ideas. It was them who introduced me 
to many local Christian families, and while through the pastor I had come 
to know the uplifted, better off part of the community, they felt responsible 
to show me the ‘real’ situation, the poorer and other part of the community. 
They invested a lot of time to help me and were very talkative. For some rea-
son though, the story I will tell soon was held back from me until the very 
end of my fieldwork. Sitting together drinking tea after another marathon of 
visiting Christian families in the city center, they started telling community 
history. The saddar of the community was elected before any church had 
been established. That time there was only the chapel house and there was 
no room for the community to meet regularly. A dispute arose between the 
people and the Catholic Church. People wanted a ‘real church’: a place to meet 
any time and a cross on the roof. The nuns filed a case against the whole com-
munity, accusing four men by name, for wanting to take over the property of 
the catholic monastery. The police started investigations and a couple of men 
were taken into investigative custody. One year before people had met in a 
private house and ‘made a community’: two representatives were selected 
carrying the title of brothers. While the duty of one of them was to visit fami-
lies and to pray with them the other was elected as saddar of the Christians. 
The latter was in charge of arranging the community’s affairs and organize 
help for people in great need. He was also responsible for negotiating the 
community’s conflict with the nuns. There were four or five more of such 
plenary meetings to which each household was called to send a male repre-
sentative. They all sat down in the saddar’s house. About two years after he 
was elected as the religious leader of the first community church. A house 
was rented for church activities and prayers and it was his job to collect the 
money from the community to pay the rent for the ‘house church’ and com-
munity activities. At that time today’s pastor of the ‘real church’ had already 
arrived at Gilgit. He was holding Sunday prayers in another ‘house church’. 
People remember that he was trained by North-American missionaries and 
supported by the well-off Christian families who sympathized with his pro-
gram of social uplift and development through education. In the aftermath 
of a conflict he and one of his elder who then led the prayers with him, parted 
ways. The conflict arose when the latter wanted to take better care of the 
poor families but the pastor rejected his request. As a result the church elder 
graduated and started studying at the bible college in Lahore. Today it is him 
leading the community church, the so called ’house church’. In the last years, 
this split of the Christian community has deepened, the two men told me. 
Sometimes the dispute between the pastors is acted out openly as rivalry, 
they argued, pointing to religious conventions that were held in Gilgit shortly 
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one after the other. That was a matter of truth as taking part was a sign of be-
longing and solidarity. As a result each side boycotted the other’s convention. 
The two brothers, who came to Gilgit without any relatives around, es-
tablished a fictive brotherhood to help out each other in daily life and in times 
of need. They both belonged to the ‘house church’. Church belonging has be-
come a serious matter in Gilgit. In local debates not only ‘real’ Christians 
are split from ‘nominal’ Christians but belonging is also a matter of rich and 
poor. The two university sweepers were sure: their community comprises of 
the poor and honest people with good hearts. They are the real Christians as 
long as their church is caring for the needy and newly arrived. Knowing that 
I had been in touch with the other pastor and also attended prayers in the 
other church, their critique was sensible but they still tried hard to convince 
me that the other, economically better off part of the community was an elit-
ist movement. They felt the situation deeply immoral and unjust as the other 
pastor had received great support from international donors and the mother 
church in Lahore and with that money now only helped their own people. 
They doubted the ‘real churches’ pastor being a good man as it was him who 
had started a morally highly dubious loan system in Gilgit. The better off 
people borrowed money to the poor demanding high interest rates. Morally 
on the right side, the needy gave back all the borrowed money once they re-
alized the deceit. When asking the accused pastor, I heard another story of 
the so called Christian welfare society.  It was the widely respected father of 
the elected saddar who founded the komiti (a common word used for rotat-
ing credit systems in Pakistan). When he invited him to lead the Christian 
welfare society the pastor refused.  From his perspective the institution col-
lapsed because the poor people misused it: they spent the credits on drugs 
instead of creating a business and as a result never paid the money back. He 
had his version of guilt and here the elected saddar was the morally dubious 
figure of the community. Blaming him of misusing his offices as he keeps 
money that he collects from the community for himself, he was responsible 
for various projects to have failed. 
But now back to the story. How did the ‘real church’ come into being? 
With help of some North-American friends the pastor – by that time he had 
already started his school project and registered the NGO – bought a plot 
to construct the Christian colony that is supposed to stand as model for the 
region. That was back in 2004. After difficult personal and legal negotiations, 
the landowner, a local Sunni, was willing to sell and they bought the land in 
Jutial, paying an exaggerated price. The town engineer remembers when the 
pastor and his men came to him. After he had checked all the laws and as he 
found no regulations that spoke against building a church in Gilgit-Baltistan 
he authorized the construction. His story ended here as his role was margin-
al as long as the construction plans were already completed and the pastor 
and his people managed everything by themselves. The pastor remembers 
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all details from here. At the moment when the wall was built serious local 
resistance arose. The main opponents of the colony were some local mul-
lahs but also the self-proclaimed Christian saddar, who was suspected to 
have spurred the mullahs on. The latter back then openly accused the pastor 
of bringing ‘western agenda and money’ to Gilgit and wanting to build an 
‘American Colony’. The pastor suggested that he acted against the project as 
he feared to lose his power to him. Whatsoever the mullahs went to court and 
filed a case against the pastor. The situation got worse but then – to make use 
of one of the pastor’s parenthesis “Jesus is stronger than the Taliban” – the 
circumstances radically changed. In early 2005, Sunnis killed the local Shia 
leader and after a range of target killings, the leaders of both Shia and Sunni 
side fled the city. A curfew was imposed and the city remained paralyzed for 
several weeks. This outbreak of sectarian violence turned out to be a unique 
chance for the church project. Public attention was distracted and due to the 
fact that the church plot was located in the cantonment area, moving around 
during the curfew was possible here. With the help of community members 
and neighbors, who were stuck at home during the curfew and without work 
and income, the construction got started. Following the pastor’ story, every-
thing went very quickly and when the curfew was over the church was built. 
Once the church was constructed, local opponents found no more support 
and so in 2006 the church was finally consecrated. Since then, construction 
in the Shepherd’s Colony went on. A women’s vocational training center was 
raised on the top and most houses have been finished. During my stay the 
boys’ hostel was completed. The struggle for a ‘real church’ though is going 
on. Recently the debate of the realness of the church is again on the rise as 
long as some critics argue that there shouldn’t be anything above a church – 
especially not a woman’s training center. 
Negotiations and struggles for space and a recognition of Christians as 
citizens of the city are going on. The political project for next election period 
is already set: to get a filter plant for the community. In times of scarcity 
the Christian colony has no access to water. Even though they are legally 
eligible, the local wardens of water distribution deny supply. Whether that 
discrimination is grounded in faith relations or whether it is linked to their 
status as immigrants isn’t clear. What is clear though is that there is a base 
for ‘citizenly’ negotiations. Just as the pastor said: “Jesus’ kingdom is based 
on relations”.
Thinking ambiguity. Multiplying modernity.
The situation of the Christians in Gilgit is marked by political negation and 
inclusion in ‘the state’, by subalternity and the potentiality of citizenship. 
Pandey’s theoretical figure of the ‘subaltern citizen’ is useful to shed light on 
such paradoxical situations as well as to focus the politics of the people living 
under such conditions: 
91
EthnoScr ipts
“[T]he phrase ‘subaltern citizen’ is not primarily intended to 
suggest the subordinate status of certain citizens, though of 
course it can be used precisely to describe such a condition in 
particular times and places. Nor it is used to describe a histori-
cal process of moving from status of subalternity to one of citi-
zenship, although again such a process may indeed be traced in 
different parts of the world, not least in the context of the anti-
colonial struggles of the eighteenth to twentieth centuries. I am 
concerned in the main with a somewhat different proposition, 
having to do with the potential that the subaltern possesses (or 
the threat s/he poses) of becoming a full member of community, 
the village, the ward and the polis.” (Pandey 2010b: 4)
The situation of Gilgit’s Christians is widely marked by not being involved in 
democratic structures and not having citizenship. The field of ‘politics’ seems 
better to be avoided, when wanting to achieve something. Own political agen-
cy was generally downplayed by all actors. So is the early argument of Subal-
tern Studies right? Does the subaltern, do subaltern politics form a separated 
sphere? And does that sphere emerge through negation by the state and/or by 
self-negation in the field of the ‘political’? But then how about Chatterjee’s ar-
gument of increasing involvement and negotiating of subaltern subjects with 
the state due to democratization and creeping technologies of governance? 
Looking at the politics in practice of the self-designated community and its 
different quarrelling actors, we get quite another picture: ‘Citizenly’ demo-
cratic structures have been established, citizen rights are being claimed and 
negotiated, and – despite the status and rights aren’t ascribed – in practice 
they prove to be accessible and it is possible to act them out. The unsettled 
political relation between the region Gilgit-Baltistan and the state of Paki-
stan not least shapes the actual socio-political situation. In the immigrated 
minority’s struggle for a place, democratic participation, access to goods and 
political representation, citizen rights appear to be a negotiable and alienable 
good that can be traded and exchanged within highly privatized networks 
spanning between the minority and ‘the state’. Citizenship becomes a ques-
tion of appropriation and practice rather than of ascription and belonging. 
Pandey’s philosophical argument of the potentiality of citizenship can be un-
derstood quite literally. While politics of the Christian community on the one 
hand seem to be shaped by a collective experience and awareness of negation 
and exclusion – a ‘subaltern self-consciousness’ – on the other hand they are 
formed by the experience and the vision of democracy and citizenship. De-
mocratization is neither an ‘objective condition’, nor is political involvement 
of marginalized people necessarily a result of changing styles of governance 
(from above).
To understand contemporary subalternities there is an urgent need to 
reconsider citizenship and democracy as imagination and therefore as po-
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tentiality. The ‘citizenly’ of subaltern politics is not only a matter of aware-
ness on the side of the researcher but asks for the very recognition of ‘citi-
zenly’ visions and practices not only under democratic conditions, but also 
where democracy seems absent. Such an approach requires reworking the 
very concepts of democracy and citizenship. How are democracy and citizen-
ship imagined, experienced and acted out in everyday life? How does a citi-
zenly self-consciousness emerge? What are rights as political practice? 
Theoretical paradigms are coming and passing. They are linked to their 
times. But who is to decide about when it is time and what are the reasons to 
bury paradigms? And that time I see no need to throw out the babies with the 
bath. The image of the ‘subaltern rebel’, just as that of the ‘subaltern citizen’ 
are theoretical notions that are useful to direct attentions and create aware-
ness of certain aspects of subalternity and power/knowledge in the past as 
well as in the present. Different times provoke different concepts and differ-
ent concepts are useful to tell different (his)stories. Our time if anything is 
calling for the multiplying of (his)stories and tracing of their interrelation.
We are living in the time of multiple modernities. Concepts seemingly 
belonging to the past can be useful to understand the present; just as stories 
about the imagined others tell stories about the authorities who write them. 
Subalternities have always been partial and subaltern societal statuses com-
plex and paradox. So are contemporary subalternities. They are marked by 
(partial) exclusion and (partial) inclusion, political negation and recognition, 
suppression and involvement, resistance and cooperation, struggle and nego-
tiation, collaboration and sabotage, subalternity and citizenship. To research, 
tell and undo subalternities, paradoxical theoretical figures and attention to 
the potentiality of citizenship (as well as domination) are no doubt of great 
use. But I don’t see that they are able to replace concepts that Chatterjee ar-
gues to belong to former times. Researching among the Christian minority 
in Pakistan and Gilgit, not only the paradox concept of the subaltern citizen 
but also the un-modulated concept of subalternity proves to be useful. “What 
an abundance of water! And the impressive caliber of the water pipes!” This 
was the exclamation of an old man, when I asked him about his job. He has 
worked all his life making bricks in rural Punjab and has come to Gilgit only 
lately after his wife has died, to live with his daughter’s family. He found a job 
in one of the central mosques, cleaning the toilet. His story, and maybe also 
his experience subverts the dominant narration of impurity and pollution, 
which is linked to the precarious social status of Christians in South Asia. 
His narration can be read as an inversion, as it is a story of abundance and 
water, instead of impurity and scarcity. Water thereby is not only a strong 
symbol of purity and means of purification, but also privilege of locals. In 
the winter months water turns to a contested good in Gilgit: a hard time 
for non-locals and new immigrants.  In many narrations that I came across 
during my fieldwork presence (personal) histories of labor migration were 
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represented as a divine plan. Coming to Gilgit, all the suffering and strug-
gles of migration have been argued to be part of one’s personal mission like 
the uplift and development of the poor Christian community, the building 
of a Pakistani nation, the establishing peace in the north, the fight against 
the ‘evil’ Christian chaudhary, the salvation of the unfaithful ‘Christians-
by name’ and ‘pagan’ ethnic tribes of the north etc. Let me point to the fact 
that ‘subaltern’ resistance against structures of domination in the discussed 
case did not only take the form of an insurrection against ‘the state’ but that 
resistances also turned against the own community i.e. habitual practices 
or its subaltern identity. In Gilgit, one faction of the self-named Christian 
community is openly fighting against the Christian ‘culture of poverty’. Their 
so-called ‘fight against the broom’ (the broom is the symbol of the menial 
cleaning-services) neither turns against the very precarious social condition 
of Christians which is based on the strict division of labor, nor against the 
South Asian narration of the Christian sweeper or discourses of im/purity, 
but rather turns against the ‘sweeper community’ itself – those of the own 
people who accept their fate and stick to a collective identity as the ‘poor’ but 
‘real’ Christians. 
It was already in the mid-eighties when Chakrabarty pointed to the am-
biguity and paradoxical character of culture(s) of subalternity. The contradic-
tion of resistance against and acceptance of a situation of domination was 
argued to be an effect of the very structural condition of subalternity. Chat-
terjee recently has argued that times have changed and so has subalternity, 
pointing to a shift from subaltern ‘politics of resistance’ to ‘negotiation’ and 
‘involvement’ with the state. But are exclusion and the image of the subaltern 
subject as ‘subaltern rebel’ imaginations that belong to the past? Should the 
image of the subaltern subject be replaced by one of the ‘subaltern citizen’? 
Revising the material from my research among the Christian minority in Gil-
git I argued that to be a wrong move. Firstly I argued that the situation of the 
religious minority in Gilgit and their politics need to be understood in their 
wider context. The diffuse, ambivalent societal situation in Gilgit, shaped by 
religious plurality, ongoing sectarian tensions and the unsettled debate of 
the political relation between the Pakistani state and the region of Gilgit-
Baltistan rather asks for reworking concepts of democracy and citizenship 
and a multiplication instead of the limitation of theoretical figures. Secondly 
I would like to point out that a reflected diversity of concepts enables the 
researcher to get rid of the paradoxes and complexities of subaltern societal 
positions, and the experiences and politics of contemporary subalternities 
that are crucially shaped by exclusion and inclusion as well as the imagina-
tion and potentiality of citizenship(s). And not least the diversity of theories 
and concepts brings the question of authority on the scene. At the end it is me 
who is responsible for the story told. 
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